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Abstract 
The United States Department of Energy is sponsoring the Light Water Reactor Sustainability program, which has the overall 
objective of supporting the near-term and the extended operation of commercial nuclear power plants. One key research and 
development (R&D) area in this program is the Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization pathway, which combines 
probabilistic risk simulation with thermohydraulic simulation codes to define and manage safety margins. The R&D efforts to 
date, however, have not included robust simulations of human operators, and how the reliability of human performance or lack 
thereof (i.e., human errors) can affect risk-margins and plant performance. This paper describes current and planned research 
efforts to address the absence of robust human reliability simulations and thereby increase the fidelity of simulated accident 
scenarios. 
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1. Introduction  
The United States (U.S.) Department of Energy sponsors the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) 
program, which has the overall objective of supporting the near-term and the extended operation of commercial 
nuclear power plants (NPPs). Life extension of existing NPPs is important because they are currently the largest 
source of carbon free electrical generation, and because the cost to build new NPPs is significantly higher. One key 
research and development (R&D) area in this program is the Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization 
(RISMC) pathway, which combines probabilistic risk simulation with thermohydraulic and reactor kinetic 
simulation codes (i.e., mechanistic multi-physics models) to define and manage safety margins for commercial NPPs 
[1] [2]. 
Broadly speaking, a “margin” is usually characterized either in deterministic or probabilistic terms. A 
deterministic margin is typically defined as the difference between capacity and load, or alternatively as the ratio of 
capacity to load. A probabilistic margin is usually defined as the probability that a load exceeds the capacity. The 
RISMC pathway uses the probabilistic margin characterization to quantify impacts to reliability and safety. 
Therefore, a probabilistic safety margin is a numerical value quantifying the probability that a safety metric (e.g., an 
important process variable such as clad temperature) will be exceeded under accident scenario conditions. This also 
means that instead of calculating risk as the frequency of an event (e.g., core damage), risk is conceptualized in 
terms of how close or not the NPP is to key safety related parameters or events, with the purpose of trying to 
understand how to better quantify and reduce uncertainty, and characterize the safety margin. 
The RISMC toolkit was developed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to perform these kinds of advanced safety 
analyses. As seen in figure 1, the toolkit uses the Multiphysics Object Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE) 
[3] as the underlying numerical solver framework, and consists of 1) the Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis 
Program (RELAP)-7 code [4], which simulates the thermohydraulics of the plant, and 2) Reactor Analysis and 
Virtual Control Environment (RAVEN) [5]. RAVEN acts as a controller of the RELAP-7 simulation and generates 
multiple scenarios by stochastically changing the order and/or timing of events. Specifically, the risk simulation 
module includes as a “scenario generator” of normal and abnormal events that serve as inputs to the mechanistic 
codes, while the mechanistic codes input physical parameters (e.g., core temperature) to the risk simulation, thereby 
creating an advanced RISMC toolkit that NPP owners and operators can use to generate a more accurate 
representation of NPP safety margins, and their associated influences on operations and economics. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The approach used to support RISMC analysis. 
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1.1. Including human reliability analysis in RISMC 
In order to more completely model and calculate probabilities within the risk simulation, the RISMC toolkit 
needs to incorporate human reliability analysis (HRA) into the scenario generator, failure models, and operational 
rules. In terms of RAVEN’s control logic, the insertion point for HRA is through the control logic equations that are 
part of RAVEN’s overall plant equations (which also include mechanistic thermohydraulic equations). The control 
logic equations control parameters in RELAP-7 such as pump speeds and valve positions, which (along with the 
aforementioned thermohydraulic equations) affect thermohydraulic variables such as pressure, temperature, and 
flow rates, which subsequently feed back to the control parameters via monitored variables (e.g., average pressure, 
delta-t). 
In previous RISMC studies [6], human interactions were modeled in a simplified manner by using the 
Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) method [7] contained in the Systems 
Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) software was used. Moreover, while 
SPAR-H uses 8 performance shaping factors (PSFs) to adjust the nominal probability that an action will happen or 
not, thereby creating a Bernoulli distribution, only two of its 8 PSFs (e.g., complexity and stress/stressors) were used 
in the previous RISMC study. 
These simplifications aside, from a simulation point of view, the goal of [6] was not to determine if an action is 
performed but rather when such action is performed. Thus, probability distribution functions (PDFs) that define the 
probability that a human related action occurs as a function of time were created. As Table 1 shows, the standard 
lognormal parameters Ɋ and ɐ were calculated from the 2 SPAR-H PSFs to create distributions representing the 
uncertainties related to when human related action is performed. 
Table 1. Correspondence table between complexity and stress/stressor level and time values. 
Complexity  ߤ (min)  Stress/stressors ߪ (min) 
High 45  Extreme 30 
Moderate 15  High 15 
Nominal 5  Nominal 5 
 
From this transformation of SPAR-H PSFs to PDFs, very simple interactions between humans and the scenario 
evolution could be modeled in the RISMC toolkit, whereby the PDFs created defined when (not if) the human action 
was performed. However, given the simplified approach used, it also meant that the accident evolution and the 
human model were uncoupled, and the SPAR-H PSFs were assumed to be constant throughout the scenario. Errors 
of omission and commission were also not included. As such, the RISMC R&D efforts to date have not included 
robust simulations of human operators, and how the reliability of human performance or lack thereof (i.e., human 
errors) can affect risk-margins and plant performance. This paper describes current and planned research efforts to 
enhance the human modeling components in order to increase the fidelity of simulated accident scenarios. 
2. Previous time-based HRA efforts 
One obvious way to enhance the research efforts undertaken thus far is to use time-based HRA models in the 
RISMC toolkit instead of SPAR-H. There are a number of time-based HRA methods and a few seminal HRA data 
collection efforts that could be used to provide modest improvements to the integration of human reliability into the 
RISMC approach. Generally speaking, time-based HRA models compute the human failure probability from the 
time available and the time needed to complete a task. The seminal examples of how timing is modeled include the 
classic HRA method, the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [8], and the Human Cognitive 
Reliability (HCR) method [9]. In addition to HRA methods development, three different research activities collected 
time-based human reliability data: the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Operator Reliability Experiments 
(ORE), the Risk Methods Integration and Evaluation Program (RMIEP) [10] [11], and the International HRA 
Empirical Study [12]. All of these sources provide timing data for NPP operators, with some focusing on high-level 
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tasks (e.g., isolating a ruptured steam generator, manually tripping the plant, etc.), and other looking at diagnosis 
activities during abnormal events. This timing data may provide useful, empirically based data for the RISMC 
toolkit. 
2.1. Timing in the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
In THERP, timing is used to predict the probability that an operator will successfully diagnose an abnormal event. 
The probability of success increases as time increases; immediately following the event, the probability of success is 
zero, but with infinite time available, the probability of successfully diagnosing the accident is one. Other factors 
(such as operator expertise) are not addressed in the model for the failure probability for diagnosis  [8]. 
Fig. 2 shows the failure probability, or time reliability curves for diagnosis as a function of time. The failure 
probability decreases as the time from the event increases. The failure timing model is based on the Nuclear 
Reliability Evaluation Program (NREP) procedures guide, [13]. Probability of failure to diagnose an abnormal event 
is assumed to be lognormal over time, generally decreasing as time from the event increases. For multiple abnormal 
events, a ten minute constant is added to the distribution for diagnosing the second event. Timing estimates are 
based entirely on expert consensus and are therefore “highly speculative,” with no data behind the model [14]. 
2.2. Human Cognitive Reliability 
The HCR method developed by EPRI improves on THERP’s treatment of timing in two significant ways. First, 
HCR includes timing considerations in multiple human failure events (not only diagnosis). Second, HCR is built on 
data from the ORE studies conducted in the 1980s, meaning that the time reliability curves employed in HCR are 
based on experimental data rather that expert judgment. As with THERP’s diagnosis failure probabilities, HCR 
estimates the probability of failure of different human interactions (HIs) using the time available and the time 
required. The method estimates the probability of non-response (i.e., the probability that an operator will not 
complete a specific HI) [15]. 
 
 
Fig. 2. THERP failure probability curves (Figure 12-4 in [8]). 
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The general approach calculates the time required for three phases of a HI: recognition of the problem, diagnosis 
of the problem, and recovery actions. For each phase, the analyst specifies the operator experience, stress, and 
quality of the human-machine interface. These three factors can increase or decrease the amount of time required for 
each phase of the HI. After calculating the time required to complete the HI’s three phases, the analyst refers to the 
appropriate HCR curve to estimate the probability of non-response [14]. 
2.3. Operator Reliability Experiment 
EPRI conducted the ORE in the 1980s to test and improve the HCR model. Data were collected at 8 plants. Four 
of the plants were boiling water reactors (BWRs) and four were pressurized water reactors (PWRs), with multiple 
crews observed at each plant. Fourteen unique PWR scenarios and 16 unique BWR scenarios were observed for the 
study, with some scenarios being repeated at multiple plants [12]. 
HCR defines three types of HIs: pre-initiating event HIs (Type A), initiating event-related HIs (Type B) and post-
initiating event HIs (Type C). Data collected in the study emphasizes Type C interactions, specifically post-
initiating, proceduralized HIs. Additionally, because Type C HIs are highly dependent on cues the plant provides 
(e.g., an alarm, a noticeable change in a plant parameter), and because success and failure are essentially defined by 
whether the operator correctly interprets and responds to that cue, a cue-response structure was defined to categorize 
operator responses to procedures into 5 different types. 
HIs are identified for each scenario, and individual crew response times are reported for each HI, along with 
scenario timelines for individual crews. The resulting aggregate data provides median response times for specific 
HIs. The expected standard deviation values for CP1-CP3 HI response times are also calculated. With this 
information, an analyst can develop a reasonable distribution for expected response times for other interactions 
without conducting extensive additional simulator studies. 
2.4. Risk Methods Integration and Evaluation Program 
For RMIEP, HRA researchers used the LaSalle NPP training simulator to collect time-based human reliability 
data related to diagnosis activities operators perform during accident scenarios. Nineteen crews from LaSalle 
participated. The objective of the effort was to collect data that would alleviate the heavy reliance on subjective 
expert judgment to inform the generation of time-reliability curves (i.e., curves showing the probability of non-
recovery as a function of time). 
The 8 different accident scenarios chosen for this study were based on prior studies that tentatively identified 
them as the dominant accident sequences for LaSalle, and as [13] states, “The recovery actions were identified and 
grouped based upon their operational similarities. Once these operational groups were formed, statistical tests were 
performed on the time data within each of the groups to determine whether the time data could be combined. If the 
statistical tests supported the operational group, then all data for actions within a group were combined and a 
function was fitted to the combined empirical data. Ten diagnosis time-reliability curves resulted which provide the 
PRA analyst with a data-based means of estimating the probability that the operators will fail to correctly diagnose 
the problem within a specified time.” (pg. 3). Overall, the RMIEP effort was one of just a few efforts with the goal 
of providing an empirical basis to help PRA estimate probabilities of success and failure for non-routine tasks, such 
as time-dependent diagnosis and misdiagnosis probabilities for accident sequences. 
2.5. International HRA Empirical Study 
The International HRA Empirical Study involved 14 crews. Each crew completed four scenarios: simple and 
complex versions of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) and a steam line break (SLB). Published reports include 
timing data for pre-defined human failure events (HFEs), and more detailed timing data are also available in the 
study data sets (see [16] and [17]). Although these data are limited to variations on two design-basis accidents, the 
relatively large number of crews in the study provides a distribution of timing data that could be used in the RISMC 
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toolkit. A related study featured similar data for loss of feedwater (LOFW) scenario variants [18]. Characteristic 
variations in timing that can be applied to other scenarios may be identifiable from these data. 
2.6. Next steps 
The RISMC toolkit has the opportunity to use the time-based HRA methods that have been developed and data 
that has been collected to better represent human actions in its risk simulations, thereby improving the overall risk 
models being used to inform margin and uncertainty quantification. Continued development of dynamic HRA 
specifically for RISMC applications also holds promise. Dynamic HRA methods are in many ways an extension of 
the early time-based methods, in that many still use the time needed versus time available logic [19] as a central 
component of their approach [20] [21]. The more recent dynamic HRA efforts are related to the Accident Dynamics 
Simulator-Information Decision and Action in Crew (ADS-IDAC) system [22], which ties together a cognitive 
model, a decision making engine, performance shaping factors, and a dynamic event simulator. ADS-IDAC was 
further extended to include a crew response model for emergency operations (i.e., a station blackout at a PWR) [23] 
and severe accidents in nuclear power plants [24]. Next steps include evaluating the feasibility of using ADS-IDAC 
in the RISMC toolkit for uncertainty quantification and safety margin characterization. 
3. Conclusion 
Nuclear power is an important component of the U.S. economy in that commercial NPPs provide reliable and 
cost-competitive base load electricity to homes and businesses. LWRS R&D activities are an important contribution 
to overall efforts to help maintain the current fleet of commercial NPPs. R&D under the RISMC pathway in 
particular is working to better define safety by changing the paradigm from calculating the frequency of failure to 
characterizing the safety margin. The R&D currently underway to include more robust models of human 
performance and error will help improve the accuracy of the probability calculations and quantification of 
uncertainties associated with characterizing safety margins. 
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